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Abstract
Should central banks increase their degree of transparency any further? We show that
there is likely to be an optimal intermediate degree of central bank transparency. Up to this
optimum more transparency is desirable: it improves the quality of private sector inﬂation
forecasts. But beyond the optimum people might: (1) start to attach too much weight to
the conditionality of their forecasts, and/or (2) get confused by the large and increasing
amount of information they receive. This deteriorates the (perceived) quality of private
sector inﬂation forecasts. Inﬂation then is set in a more backward looking manner resulting
in higher inﬂation persistence. By using a panel data set on the transparency of 100 central
banks we ﬁnd empirical support for an optimal intermediate degree of transparency at which
inﬂation persistence is minimized. Our results indicate that while there are central banks
that would beneﬁt from further transparency increases, some might already have reached
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11 Introduction
Only a few decades ago monetary policy making was veiled in secrecy. In 1986 Goodfriend
summarized the arguments for secrecy that were used by the Federal Reserve in the Merrill
versus FOMC court case. It encouraged further research on the desirability of secrecy because
the theoretical arguments were inconclusive. Nowadays, central banks have made several steps
towards transparent monetary policy regimes and they pay a lot of attention to day to day
communication with the ﬁnancial markets and the public at large.
Central banks are likely to continue their transparency enhancing practices. The most recent
step of the US Federal Reserve was to increase and expand the content of the disclosed economic
forecasts of the Federal Reserve Board members and the Reserve Bank presidents. Bernanke’s
comments on this move pointed out that these transparency changes
"...represent just one more step on the road toward greater transparency at the Federal Re-
serve." (Bernanke, November 14th 2007).
Not only is transparency used as a tool for independent central banks to be held accountable,
it is often argued that transparency is also desirable from an economic point of view. Policymak-
ers and researchers have discussed the possible economic eﬀects of central bank transparency.
Theoretically, the debate on the desirability of transparency is a continuing story, although the
more recent literature tends to favor more transparency. Most empirical research concludes that
previous transparency enhancements were desirable from an economic point of view. For ex-
ample, they resulted in improved anticipation of monetary policy and better anchored inﬂation
expectations (van der Cruijsen and Demertzis 2007). For a recent overview of the transparency
literature we refer to van der Cruijsen and Eijﬃnger (2007).
We investigate whether it is desirable for central banks to increase their degree of transparency
any further. We use two theoretical arguments in the transparency debate (uncertainty and con-
fusion/information overload) to substantiate our case for the presence of an optimal intermediate
degree of transparency. While the previous theoretical literature makes a case for or against
one particular kind of transparency, e.g. the publication of the goals of the central bank or the
central banks forecasts of inﬂation, our analysis is about the optimal degree of overall monetary
policy transparency.
We relate central bank transparency to the quality of private sector forecasts. At low degrees
of transparency, more information provision (e.g. about the complexity of monetary policy
making and the conditionality of policy and economic forecasts) might be desirable because it
could improve the private sector’s forecasts of inﬂation. However, at some degree of transparency
more transparency might be detrimental because it could worsen these forecasts. We argue that
for two reasons this is likely to hold.
The ﬁrst reason is that a lot of transparency could lead to uncertainty. By providing too
much information, people start to focus too much on the complexity of monetary policy making
and the uncertainty surrounding forecasts. While the actual quality of their forecasts might not
be aﬀected, agents perceive the quality of their forecasts to be worse.
The second reason is that a high degree of transparency could lead to an information overload
and confusion. The assumption that individuals are capable to absorb, understand and weigh all
the information that the central bank provides is probably to strong. Although some degree of
transparency might help clarify matters, it is likely that a large amount of information disclosure
would result in an information overload and confusion. At some level of transparency agents can
not see the forest for the trees. This would deteriorate their inﬂation forecasts.
Since the (perceived) quality of inﬂation forecasts is diﬃcult to measure we use the degree of
backward lookingness of inﬂation as a proxy. The latter is negatively related to the (perceived)
quality of inﬂation forecasts. Price setters are more inclined to determine price increases based
on past inﬂation when they can not rely on their forecasts of future inﬂation. We use a New
2Keynesian model to illustrate that the higher the degree of backward lookingness of price setting
is, the more persistent inﬂation is which is detrimental for the society’s welfare. There is an
optimal degree of central bank transparency at which inﬂation persistence is minimized. For
central banks it is relevant to have insight in inﬂation persistence: the speed with which inﬂation
reacts to shocks hitting the economy. The faster inﬂation returns to its equilibrium level (the
inﬂation target in case of credible monetary policy) after the occurrence of shocks to the economy,
the easier it is for central banks to perform monetary policy.
To our knowledge the empirical research on an optimal degree of central bank transparency
has just started and focusses on analyzing the eﬀects of particular aspects of transparency in-
stead of the overall level. It shows us that most forms of transparency lead to better economic
outcomes while some do not. Therefore it seems to be optimal to have an intermediate degree
of transparency by limiting some forms of transparency. For example, Ehrmann and Fratzscher
(2008) demonstrate that limiting the communication in the week before Federal Open Market
Committee meetings is a useful way to prevent market volatility and speculation. One way in
which we contribute to the literature is by analyzing which degree of overall monetary policy
transparency would be optimal.
Theoretically both the "uncertainty"- and the "confusion / information overload"-argument
support the idea of an optimal intermediate degree of transparency. We can test this hypoth-
esis empirically by relating transparency to inﬂation persistence. By allowing for a quadratic
relationship between central bank transparency and inﬂation persistence we build further on the
research of Dincer and Eichengreen (2007), who ﬁnd a negative relationship between central bank
transparency and inﬂation persistence. We ﬁnd empirical support for our hypothesis by using
their panel data set on the transparency of 100 central banks. Our ﬁnding that an intermediate
degree of transparency (so neither full secrecy nor complete transparency) is optimal is robust
to various settings. Given the nature of the data, however, it is diﬃcult to be certain about the
exact optimal degree of transparency. First, transparency is diﬃcult to measure. Constructed
indices are necessarily subjective in their choice of which aspects of transparency to include and
how to weigh these components. Second, our empirical analysis has to be performed using trans-
parency values that are observed in practice. Our baseline regressions lead to an optimum of 6,
whereas theoretically it could be somewhere between 0 and 15. We have some reason to believe
that the actual optimal degree of transparency might be higher. Low degrees of transparency
are observed more often. The average degree of transparency in the sample is about 4 and very
high transparency scores are not observed at all (13.5 is the highest value in our data set). A
regression with only OECD countries results in an optimal degree of 7.5. Despite uncertainty
about the exact optimum, our results do point out that while several central banks (especially
those of developing countries) are likely to beneﬁt from further transparency increases, there is
a transparency level at which more public information is detrimental. Central banks would be
wise to not become completely transparent.
First we will expound our theoretical case for an optimal intermediate degree of central bank
transparency (Section 2). We discuss all possible empirical relationships between central bank
transparency and inﬂation persistence one might observe in practice, including our hypothesis:
the optimal transparency regime. Then, in Section 3, we talk through our empirical analysis and
present the actual empirical relationship we ﬁnd. Last, we conclude in Section 4.
2 Optimal central bank transparency: Theory
In this theoretical section, we ﬁrst summarize the related literature on optimal degrees of trans-
parency in Section 2.1. Then, we discuss our case for an optimal intermediate degree of trans-
parency in four steps in Section 2.2.
32.1 Related theoretical literature
A lot of theoretical research has been conducted on the desirability of central bank transparency
from an economic viewpoint. Findings both in favour and against transparency exist. Van der
Cruijsen and Eijﬃnger (2007) give an overview of this literature and shows there is a tendency of
the more recent work to favor most, although not all, forms of central bank transparency. Here we
brieﬂy discuss research that points at the desirability of an intermediate degree of transparency.
Jensen (2002) shows that, within a forward looking model, some intermediate degree of trans-
parency may be optimal. In his New Keynesian model it is easier for the public to distill the
intentions of the central bank when it is transparent about the control errors. Inﬂation expecta-
tions and, as a result, inﬂation become more responsive to the central bank’s monetary policy.
This will most likely result in more attention of the central bank to inﬂation. This is beneﬁcial
for a central bank that faces a low degree of credibility but it could be undesirable for a relatively
credible central bank. In case of transparency, stabilizing output costs more in terms of inﬂa-
tion. The trade-oﬀ between credibility (and the related degree of inﬂation) and the ﬂexibility to
stabilize output determines which amount of transparency is optimal.1
Another argument in favor of limiting the degree of central bank transparency is provided
by Morris and Shin (2002) who show that a lot of public information might be harmful as it
crowds out private information. In their model, economic agents have an incentive to match
the underlying economic fundamentals, about which they can have both private and public
information, and they want to coordinate their actions with other agents (no value added from
an aggregate point of view). The coordination motive might lead agents to put more weight on
the public signal than is justiﬁed by the level of its precision. As a result, the damage caused
by noise in the public information (worsening the forecasts of economic fundamentals and as a
result the actions taken) might be higher. However, Svensson (2006) argues that for empirically
reasonable parameter values, more public information is desirable in the Morris and Shin (2002)
model. The only exception is when: (1) each agent puts more weight on the coordination motive
than on the motive to bring actions in line with economic fundamentals, and (2) the noise in the
public signal is at least eight times higher than the noise of the private signal. This is unlikely
because central banks spend a lot of resources on collecting and interpreting data.
In contrast, by introducing costs in the Morris and Shin framework Demertzis and Hoeberichts
(2007) show that, for reasonable parameter values, more transparency is not always desirable.
When it is costly for the private sector to process information, more public information reduces
the incentives for the private sector to gather their own private information.
With a model in which public information is endogenous, Morris and Shin (2005) point again
at the possible negative eﬀects of public information. Providing a lot of information to steer
market expectations might be undesirable because it could lower the informativeness of ﬁnancial
markets and prices and, therefore, worsen public information.
Several researchers argue, in contrast to Morris and Shin (2002), that coordination is useful
from an aggregate viewpoint. But even then, maximum transparency need not be optimal. For
example, Walsh (2007) argues that the reduction of price dispersion is desirable. His analysis
shows that increased precision of central bank’s forecasts of cost disturbances (or lower persis-
tence of these shocks) increases the optimal degree of economic transparency. More transparency
makes it easier for the private sector to distinguish between supply and demand shocks. Then it
becomes easier to neutralize demand shocks without destabilizing inﬂation and output. In addi-
tion, the detrimental eﬀect of more transparency about the central bank’s signal of supply shocks,
the increase of the volatility of private sector inﬂation expectations and through it inﬂation, is
lower when the central bank’s forecasts of the supply shocks are more accurate. In contrast, the
1If instead the central bank would reveal its preferences for output directly, then expectations do not
react to central bank’s actions and the central bank would remain ﬂexible to stabilize output.
4optimal level of transparency turns out to be higher when the errors of the central bank’s fore-
casts of demand disturbances are larger (or these disturbances become more persistent) because
transparency can prevent forecast errors to spill over to aﬀect inﬂation.
Dale et al. (2008) show that the disclosure of certain information (e.g. the inﬂation target of
the central bank) is helpful because it improves private sector expectations. However, like Morris
and Shin (2002), the communication of uncertain information (e.g. inﬂation forecasts) might be
detrimental because agents could put too much weight on it. The mechanism underlying this
result is diﬀerent than in Morris and Shin (2002). When the central bank communicates its
forecasts of inﬂation, the private sector uses it in combination with its own forecasts to form
inﬂation expectations. The private sector has to estimate the relative quality of the forecasts
to weigh these forecasts accordingly. The more uncertain the forecasts of the central bank are,
the higher the risk that mistakes in determining the weights result in poorer private sector
expectations compared to the no-communication case. When the central bank communicates
certain information (its inﬂation target), the private sector forecasts are of relatively high quality
(compared to a situation without central bank communication) and the risk that additional,
uncertain, information works as a source of distraction is therefore higher.
Cukierman (2008) probes the limits of central bank transparency both by looking at its
feasibility and its desirability. He argues that for central bankers it is not feasible to be transparent
about everything because of their limited knowledge about how the economy works. For example,
because it is hard to measure the output gap it is diﬃcult to be transparent about it. Even when
abstaining from these feasibility constraints, Cukierman (2008) argues that it is not desirable for
a central bank to be transparent about everything. For example, using a variant of the Diamond
Dybvig (1983) model of bank runs, the immediate disclosure of private information about threats
to ﬁnancial stability turns out to be undesirable.
2.2 A case for optimal transparency
Our hypothesis is that neither secrecy nor complete transparency is optimal, but some intermedi-
ate degree is to be preferred. Figure 1 summarizes the steps we take to underpin this hypothesis.
 
(1) “uncertainty” & (2) “confusion/information overload” 
support the idea of an optimal degree of transparency (T) at 
which the quality of inflation forecasts (QF) is maximized. 
As a proxy for QF we take the degree of backward 
lookingness of inflation (b). If QF deteriorates b increases. 
As a proxy for b we take the degree of inflation persistence 
(B). With a New-Keynesian model we illustrate that b and B 
are positively related.  
Step 1:  0 ) , (
2 ³ =
- +
withT T T f QF   
Step 4:  0 ) , (
2 ³ =
+ -
T with T T f B  
 
We link B to T and present the various transparency regimes 
that might exist (including the optimal transparency regime, 
which we expect to observe). 
Step 2:  ) (
-
= QF f b  
 
Step 3:  ) (
+
= b f B  
 
Figure 1. A case for optimal transparency: Theoretical underpinning
We start our case for an optimal degree of transparency by relating the degree of central bank
transparency (T) to the quality of private sector inﬂation forecasts (QF). By using two arguments
in the transparency debate, uncertainty and confusion/information overload, we point out that
there is likely to be an optimal degree of central bank transparency at which the quality of
inﬂation forecasts is optimized. Note that we analyze the desirability of central bank transparency
5in general, whereas previous theoretical research focusses on one or a couple particular aspect of
transparency (see van der Cruijsen and Eijﬃnger 2007). The second step is then to ﬁnd a proxy
for the quality of inﬂation forecasts. We use the degree to which inﬂation is formed in backward
looking way (b). Since this is also not easy to measure, we point out that the higher b is the more
persistent inﬂation is. This is illustrated with a standard New-Keynesian model. The last step
is then to relate this inﬂation persistence measure (B) to the degree of transparency. We show
that although there are ﬁve diﬀerent types of transparency regimes possible, our argumentation
leads to the hypothesis that there exists an optimal transparency regime: an intermediate degree
of transparency at which inﬂation persistence is minimized. Next, we will discuss our steps one
by one in more detail.
2.2.1 Step 1: Transparency and the quality of forecasts
We present two arguments why there might be a link between central bank transparency and the
quality of inﬂation forecasts of the private sector: the "uncertainty"-argument and the "confu-
sion/information overload"-argument.
1) Uncertainty
The extent to which a central bank achieves its goals is very important for its credibility. For
a central bank it is therefore helpful to explain the conditionality of its monetary policy steps and
outcomes. Otherwise deviations from the central bank’s announced goals or policy path might
harm its reputation. Issing (2005) stresses that communication is not that simple: the central
bank needs to ﬁnd a balance between the need to be clear and the need to convey the complexity
and conditionality of monetary policy making. The central bank faces uncertainty about various
things, e.g. shocks hitting the economy, how well its own model explains reality and how eﬀective
it is in inﬂuencing inﬂation expectations (Woodford 2003). Issing (2005) argues that one good
communication strategy would be to use clear wording to explain complex facts but not provide
the illusion that the world is certain.
The ﬁrst argument we use to establish our case for the presence an optimal degree of trans-
parency is what we call the "uncertainty argument". At low levels of transparency the private
sector does not have a solid basis for making inﬂation forecasts. Up to the optimal degree of
transparency, more central bank transparency is likely to result in more insight into future inﬂa-
tion and its conditionality and to improve the quality of the forecasts of private agents. However,
beyond the optimal degree of transparency, additional transparency is undesirable. A lot of in-
formation on the conditionality might lead people to focus too much on this conditionality which
reduces the perceived quality of their forecasts.
2) Confusion/information overload
Another argument why there is likely to be an optimal degree of central bank transparency
is the "confusion / information overload argument". At low levels of transparency, additional
information provision by the central bank might be a helpful tool for the private sector to im-
prove the quality of their inﬂation forecasts. However at some degree of transparency additional
transparency (deﬁned as providing additional information) is likely to cause confusion instead of
clarity. With a lot of information communicated, it will become unrealistic to assume that indi-
viduals are capable to absorb, understand and weigh all this information. They are then likely to
suﬀer from an overload of information. The resulting confusion would worsen the quality of their
inﬂation forecasts. Previous research supports this "confusion / information overload argument".
The idea that a share of the population forms inﬂation expectations in a bounded rational
way is supported by the outcomes of a survey among 1800 Dutch households by van der Cruijsen
and Eijﬃnger (2008). For example, when asked for their inﬂation expectations persons are more
inclined to report round numbers. In addition, some respondents report inﬂation expectations
6that are very unlikely (e.g. 80%) which doubts their understanding of the concept of inﬂation.
Most respondents already suﬀer from an information overload, indicated by the fact that their
knowledge about the European Central Bank’s transparency practices is lacking or even incorrect.
This conﬁrms the idea of limited processing capability (in line with Sims 2003).
That behavior deviates from full rationality is shown by behavioral economics research. Psy-
chological factors might aﬀect the formation of inﬂation expectations. For example, people often
disregard new information that is not in line with their previous beliefs (Rabin 1998: 26). This
would make the gradual adjustment towards the rational value of inﬂation expectations slower
as people are slower to adapt their beliefs. In addition, people might suﬀer from a conﬁrmation
bias: they interpret information in such a way that their prior beliefs are conﬁrmed. This belief
perseverance also explains slow adjustments of inﬂation expectations. Economic agents inter-
pret information diﬀerently because of their dissimilar views on the environment (Babcock and
Loewenstein 1997). These heuristics make it easier to perform complex tasks but they may lead
people to make large mistakes (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). An overload of information could
lead people to, unconsciously, trust more on these heuristics. Assuming learning agents, at some
point of transparency more public information might reduce the learning speed, because people
have to process more (confusing instead of clarifying) information. An information overload is
therefore likely to result in worse quality of inﬂation forecasts.
The "sticky-information"-model of Mankiw and Reis (2002) encompasses the idea that macro-
economic information spreads slowly through the population. Mankiw and Reis (2002) mention
two reasons why only a share of price setters updates its prices: 1) the costs of acquiring in-
formation, and 2) the costs of re-optimization. Those that do adjust their prices realize that
not everybody does so and this awareness will limit the size of their adjustment. In this model
expectations are formed in a rational way, but this does not happen so often. We believe that at
a low degree of transparency, more transparency could lead to a reduction of the costs of acquir-
ing information, but if transparency becomes too high it becomes more diﬃcult to interpret all
the provided information correctly which instead raises the costs of distilling useful information.
Assuming the resources spend on gathering useful information remain constant, then the higher
information costs worsen the inﬂation forecasts. Zbaracki et al. (2004) show that these costs of
gathering and processing information are much more relevant when deciding whether to change
prices than the costs of making new price lists.
Another explanation for inﬂation persistence is given by Amato and Laubach (2003). They
show that when not all price setters are optimizing but some have rule-of-thumb behavior (like
e.g. in Gali et al. 2001) then there is endogenous inﬂation persistence. Some agents have
limited capacity to form rational expectations. These rule-of-thumbers imitate the behavior of
all agents one period earlier. Depending on the random optimization costs price setters either
behave optimally or as a rule-of-thumber. The higher the number of rule-of-thumbers the higher
inﬂation persistence will be. We argue that too much transparency could result in an information
overload, therefore higher optimization costs, which would lead to a larger share of rule-of-thumb
price setters and eventually in higher inﬂation persistence.
Roberts (1998) analyzes survey data of inﬂation expectations and ﬁnds support for an inter-
mediate degree of rationality: inﬂation expectations are neither formed in a purely rational way
nor by only using lagged inﬂation. Two models ﬁt the data. The ﬁrst is a "partly adaptive model"
where a share of the population forms inﬂation expectations by looking at lagged inﬂation, while
others form expectations in a rational way. In the second model Roberts assumes a model with
"habit persistence" in inﬂation expectations. Inﬂation expectations are described as "stubborn"
in the sense that they adjust only gradually towards the rational value. Professional forecasters
might be hesitant to change their forecasts of inﬂation for two reasons. First, they could be
afraid to look foolish when making large adjustments in their forecasts in response to new in-
formation. Therefore, they would prefer smaller adjustments. Second, they might want to make
forecast that do not diﬀer that much from those of other professionals. The latter would result
in backward looking behavior, as forecasters would base their forecasts partly on the previously
7published forecasts of other professionals. These forecasts of professionals are likely to aﬀect the
inﬂation expectations of e.g. households. Carroll (2001) shows that the inﬂation expectations of
the public at large follow those of professional forecasters with a lag.
Let us now relate these ﬁndings to central bank transparency. When agents care about
coordination with other agents (argued by Morris and Shin 2002, too) then they are more likely
to respond to new information by the central bank not only when they believe it would improve
the quality of their inﬂation forecasts but also when they believe other forecasters will look
at the same information. This behavior would increases the likelihood that they adjust their
expectations in a similar way. Now assume that the central bank becomes very transparent. In
that case a lot of information is produced and for agents it is more diﬃcult to know which kind
of information other forecasters will pick up. In this "information overload"-situation they might
be more induced to have a higher degree of backward looking expectations formation since it is
diﬃcult to form good quality inﬂation forecasts and to predict the inﬂation forecasts of other
agents. Agents are more hesitant to react to news because they are not sure whether their forecast
will remain close to these of other agents. In addition, with a lot of public information it is more
easy to pick up the wrong information and to make mistakes, which makes people careful to put
too much weight on inﬂation forecasts. Furthermore, it will be more diﬃcult to process all the
information. The gradual adjustment process towards the rational value of inﬂation expectations
that Roberts (1998) describes, is then likely to take longer. Alternatively, referring to Roberts’
"partly adaptive model", the share of people forming inﬂation expectations by looking at lagged
inﬂation probably is higher in case of an information overload because the quality of the inﬂation
forecasts is worse since it is more diﬃcult for a larger share of people to absorb all the relevant
information dispersed.
Examples
One example of a case in which transparency might have led to more confusion and uncer-
tainty is transparency about the European Central Bank’s "Two Pillar Strategy". This strategy
puts an important role on (1) money and (2) a broadly based judgement of future price develop-
ments and risks to price stability at a Euro area level. According to common used transparency
measures more information provision results in a higher degree of transparency. The fact that the
European Central Bank communicates it follows a two-pillar strategy is transparency enhancing
(e.g. Eijﬃnger and Geraats 2006). However, in reality it need not be that more information leads
to more clarity. De Haan et al. (2005: 16-25) argue that the unclear and changing weights of the
pillars may confuse people. The conclusion of an 2003 evaluation of the ECB’s monetary policy
strategy was that, although it was helpful internally as a framework for analysis and debate, it
was diﬃcult to communicate externally.2 This is conﬁrmed by the research presented by van der
Cruijsen and Eijﬃnger (2008). A share of 1/6 of Dutch households members feel interest rate
decisions are not made in a clear fashion. This share is even up to 1/2 for those respondents that
can be qualiﬁed as "economic experts".3 An unclear strategy results into a worse quality of the
inﬂation forecasts of the public via more confusion.
Another example is the publication of inﬂation fan charts by the Bank of England By showing
how uncertain it actually is about future inﬂation in a graph, people might not only start to put
too much weight to the uncertainty of central banks, but they might also get confused. As a
response the actual and perceived quality of their own forecast might deteriorate.
As a last example we would like to mention the Financial Stability Reports. They are often
so long that readers can not see the forest for the trees. Therefore it might be diﬃcult to grasp a
2See the ECB press release of 8 May 2003: "The ECB’s monetary policy strategy" for more details.
The evaluation led to improved external communication (e.g. the introductory statement of the President
at the press conference after monetary policy meetings).
3Two diﬀerent expert-deﬁnitions are used: (1) respondents with very good economic knowledge (self-
assessment) and (2) respondents that deal with economic, ﬁnancial or monetary matters on a daily
basis.
8clear measure and it might be easy to make mistakes when weighing all the included information.
Also it is more easy to interpret information incorrectly and in line with previous believes. This
is detrimental for the private sector forecasts.
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005) support the idea that too much transparency might cause
confusion. In contrast to transparency about diﬀerent points of views about the economicoutlook,
transparency about committee members’ disagreement about monetary policy worsens the extent
to which monetary policy decisions are anticipated.
2.2.2 Step 2: The degree of backward lookingness of inﬂation as a proxy for the
quality of forecasts
Because we can not measure the quality of forecasts directly, we take the degree of backward
lookingness of inﬂation (b) as a proxy. If price setters are unable to forecast inﬂation very
well, they are likely to set prices by putting much weight to something they are certain about:
inﬂation in the past. The lower the quality of the inﬂation forecasts is, the larger the degree
to which inﬂation will be set in a backward looking manner either by lowering the frequency of
price updating behavior of all agents or by increasing the share of rule-of-thumbers. Note that
even a change in the perceived quality of private sector forecasts is enough to shift the degree of
backward lookingness. When people start to realize that the central bank is uncertain about the
future policy outcomes the actual quality of their inﬂation forecasts need not change, but it does
change the perceived quality of their forecasts which is relevant for price-setting behavior.
2.2.3 Step 3: Inﬂation persistence as a proxy for the degree of backward lookingness
of inﬂation
Since it is diﬃcult to measure the private sector’s weight that is put on inﬂation forecasts when
forming current inﬂation, we use inﬂation persistence instead. The higher the degree of backward
lookingness, the more persistent inﬂation is. We illustrate this with a standard hybrid New-
Keynesian model:
xt = Et(xt+1) −a(it − Et(πt+1)) a > 0 (1)
πt = (1 − b)Et(πt+1) + b(πt−1) + cxt + et et ∼ idd(0,σ2); 0 ≤ b ≤ 1 (2)
Where x is the output gap, i is the nominal interest rate, π is the inﬂation rate, b measures
the degree to which inﬂation formation is backward looking, t is the time indicator, E is the
expectations operator and e is and exogenous shock to inﬂation. Equation (1) is the forward-
looking IS-curve. When b=0 equation (2) is the traditional New Keynesian Phillips curve and
there is no endogenous inﬂation persistence (the term b(πt−1) falls out). Instead when b>0 we
get a modiﬁed version of the New-Keynesian Phillips curve with endogenous inﬂation persistence.
The higher b is, the higher the endogenous inﬂation persistence will be.
In addition to endogenous inﬂation persistence (b>0), it is possible to add exogenous inﬂation
persistence to the model by making the shock to inﬂation (et) persistent (et = ρet−1). Then even
when inﬂation is fully forward looking (b=0), it is possible to have inﬂation persistence. In case
b>0, the persistence resulting from price shocks is even higher. In addition to the exogenous per-
sistence these shocks create (via et), they cause additional endogenous inﬂation persistence (via
b(πt−1)). Assuming persistent shocks would only amplify the diﬀerence in inﬂation persistence
between the cases b=0 and b>0 but not change the qualitative insight that the higher b is, the
higher inﬂation persistence is.









Where Vt is the expected loss of the central bank. β is the discount factor and λ measures
the central bank’s preference for output stabilization relative to its preference for price stability.
9Note that the choice of this loss function can be justiﬁed by referring to a representative agent
maximizing expected utility (with a slight modiﬁcation) (Woodford 2003).
Inﬂation persistence is lower when inﬂation is less backward looking (b is lower). A lower
degree of backward lookingness leads to a lower expected loss for the central bank. For the
central bank it then becomes easier to via the management of inﬂation expectations bring inﬂation
faster and better in line with its inﬂation goal. The output costs of reducing inﬂation will be
lower resulting in a better inﬂation output trade-oﬀ. For the central bank more insight into the
Phillips-curve is relevant since it provides information about the eﬀectiveness of its policy. As
Yellen (2007) argues, it would improve central bank’s inﬂation forecasts and help them get more
understanding of which policy the central bank should follow.
2.2.4 Step 4: Linking central bank transparency to inﬂation persistence
Both "uncertainty" and "confusion/information overload" suggest the presence of an optimal
intermediate amount of central bank transparency at which inﬂation persistence is minimized.
Each theory can be expressed by one equation that relates central bank transparency (T) to
inﬂation persistence (B).
B1 = j1T + h1T2 + Z T ≧ 0 (4)
B2 = j2T + h2T2 + Z T ≧ 0 (5)
In equation (4) and equation (5) Z is a vector of control variables. Since each separate
argument is in favor of an optimal degree of central bank transparency, this should result in a
parabola (jn<0 and hn>0). When we weigh these (n) theories according to their relevance (αn)
to get the overall relationship between central bank transparency and inﬂation persistence (see





B = jT +hT2 + Z









αn = 1 (6)
In equation (6) B is an index for inﬂation persistence, T is an index for transparency, Z is
a vector of control variables. On the basis of the values of the coeﬃcients for h and j, we can
distinguish ﬁve possible kinds of transparency regimes:
I) Secrecy (h≥0; j>0 or h>0; j≥0). In this case complete secrecy results in the lowest degree of
inﬂation persistence.
II) Optimal transparency (h >0;j<0). This is our hypothesis.
III) Maximum transparency (h≤0; j<0 or h<0; j≤0 ). Here more transparency is always better.
IV) One low and one high transparency equilibrium (h<0; j>0).
V) Transparency is irrelevant (h=0; j=0). In this case transparency is not related to inﬂation
persistence.
Table 1 and Figure 2 give an overview of the various transparency regimes that result from
diﬀerent values for h and j.
Table 1. Transparency regimes
j\ h 0 + -
0 irrelevance secrecy maximum transparency
+ secrecy secrecy two equilibria
- maximum transparency optimal transparency maximum transparency
Note: This table gives an overview of the various transparency regimes that result
from diﬀerent settings of j and h in equation (6).
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Figure 2. Various transparency regimes
Note: This ﬁgure gives an overview of the various transparency regimes that result from diﬀerent settings
of j and h in equation (6). B=index for inﬂation persistence, T=index for transparency and T* is the
optimal degree of transparency at which inﬂation persistence is minimized. Five diﬀerent transparency
regimes are possible:
I) The secrecy regime (h≥0; j>0 or h>0; j≥0).
II) The optimal transparency regime (h >0;j<0).
III) The maximum transparency regime (h≤0; j<0 or h<0; j≤0 ).
IV) Two optimal degrees of transparency: one low (T1*) and one high (T2*) (h<0; j>0).
V) Transparency is irrelevant (h=0; j=0).
We have simpliﬁed graph I and III by drawing straight lines. Note however that this holds only when
h=0. Instead when h =0, these lines have curvature. We did not plot graph V (it would be a horizontal
line).
Now that we know what the possible empirical relationships between central bank trans-
parency and inﬂation persistence are we can turn to the data and investigate for which trans-
parency regime there is empirical support.
3 Empirical analysis
The last decade there has been a variety of empirical research on the economic eﬀects of central
bank transparency. Some of this work relates transparency to inﬂation persistence. For example,
in van der Cruijsen and Demertzis (2007) the transparency data of Eijﬃnger and Geraats (2006)
is used to show that countries with a higher degree of central bank transparency have lower
inﬂation persistence. This result is obtained by rearranging the persistence measures obtained
for several countries by Levin et al. (2004). Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) have extended the
transparency data set of Eijﬃnger and Geraats (2006) to 100 countries and a longer time period
(1998-2005). Using this data set, they conﬁrm the negative relationship between transparency
and inﬂation persistence. We build further on this empirical research by investigating thepresence
11of a quadratic relationship between transparency and persistence and by including several control
variables inspired by micro studies on inﬂation persistence.4
3.1 Transparency data
For this analysis we use the transparency data set of Dincer and Eichengreen (2007), who con-
struct transparency indices similar to Eijﬃnger and Geraats (2006). Dincer and Eichengreen
(2007) have extended the data set of Eijﬃnger and Geraats (2006) in two ways: (1) the sample
is extended to 100 countries instead of 9, and (2) the data period is broadened to 1998-2005.














Figure 3. Central bank transparency
Source: This ﬁgure is constructed with the use of the data in Dincer and Eichengreen (2007). The gray
line provides the range of observed values.
Although theoretically possible values lie between 0 and 15, in practice the highest degree of
transparency observed is 13.5. Comparing continents, the central banks of Europe turn out to
be the most transparent, closely followed by the central banks of Oceania. African central banks
on average have the lowest degree of transparency. The transparency of Asian central banks is
a bit higher. The transparency scores of the central banks of American countries lie between
those of relatively transparent and relatively intransparent continents. In general, the level of
transparency has risen over time. Only for a few countries we observe a, temporary, decrease
in transparency. The range of observed degrees of transparency is broad. For example, in 2005
the central banks of Aruba and Bangladesh obtained a transparency score of 0.5, close to the
minimum, while the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (with a score of 13.5) received a score that was
close to the maximum. We utilize both the country and the time dimension of this transparency
data set. For more details on the transparency data we refer to Appendix A.2.
3.2 Inﬂation data
In addition to transparency data we construct inﬂation persistence measures by utilizing CPI
inﬂation data. The inﬂation data (q.o.q. annualized inﬂation rate, for more details see Appendix
A.2) we use is from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) database, which is a product of
the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
4Note that Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) use two control factors (openness and ﬁnancial depth).
12What we are interested in is the degree of inﬂation persistence. Inﬂation persistence is the
speed with which inﬂation moves back towards its equilibrium level after shocks occur (e.g. a
change in the inﬂation goal of the central bank). When inﬂation persistence is this adjustment
process occurs faster. For central banks it is interesting to know how inﬂation responds to shocks
hitting the economy. If a central bank wants to follow a preemptive monetary policy strategy,
insight in the reaction of inﬂation to changing monetary conditions is needed.
In the literature inﬂation persistence is measured in several ways. Marques (2004) provides a
useful overview of the various methods at hand. An often used measure of inﬂation persistence,
which we will use too, is the sum of the autoregressive coeﬃcients: ρ =
￿p
j=1 βj which can be
obtained by estimating inﬂation (π) on its lags:




Other examples of measures that also give an estimate of the average speed with which
inﬂation returns to its equilibrium level after a shock has occurred are the largest autoregressive
root (e.g. Stock 2001) and the half-life. Critique on the largest autoregressive root is the fact
that it does not summarize the impulse response function well, as it shape depends on all the
roots. The half life is the time for which the eﬀect of a shock to inﬂation is larger than 0.5.
Although easy to interpret this measure has several disadvantages. For example, in case of an
oscillating impulse response function this measure might underestimate the inﬂation persistence
and it is diﬃcult to compare series with diﬀerent forms of impulse response functions.
3.3 Method
As mentioned before, we intend to relate inﬂation persistence to the degree of central bank
transparency by using both the time content of our transparency data as well as the cross-
country information. Because it is diﬃcult to determine a diﬀerent inﬂation persistence measure
for each moment in time, we have included the transparency measure in a direct way in our
estimation of the degree of inﬂation persistence. With equation (8) we test whether and how
transparency is related to inﬂation persistence. The transparency interaction terms grasp the
eﬀect of transparency on inﬂation persistence.











With π=inﬂation (q.o.q. annualized), T=the degree of transparency (which in our sample is
between 0 and 13.5), B=the degree of inﬂation persistence (which varies across countries because
of diﬀerent values for T) and ε=the error terms. i = 1,2,..,I indicates the cross-sectional units
and t = 1,2,..T the periods. An overall constant α is included. Z is a vector of control variables
that aﬀect the level of inﬂation.5 In addition, we include n control variables (Y ) that aﬀect the
degree of inﬂation persistence.
5Note that not all the control variables that we include are time variant. Therefore they grasp cross-
section ﬁxed eﬀects.
13Because the period under consideration is relatively short, we do not explicitly consider breaks
in the mean of inﬂation, only to the extent that it might be captured by time-variation in Z.6
Various information criteria can be used to determine the optimal lag length to include in
equation (8). For example, Levin et al. (2004) use the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) to
analyze for each country separately the optimal lag size. Because we perform panel data analysis,
we instead pick one lag length for the whole sample. Here we present the results of our baseline
case with one lag. Our transparency insights are robust to changes in the lag length (see Appendix
B.2).
Previous studies have shown that several other factors besides transparency are relevant
for inﬂation persistence too (e.g. Fabiani et al. 2005). By adding control variables to our
regressions we correct for this. Detailed information on these control variables is in Appendix
A.3. We take into account control factors in two ways. First, some control factors are included
as an interaction term with lagged inﬂation (control variable*πi,t−1) because they aﬀect inﬂation
persistence. Second, we add control factors that are relevant for the level of inﬂation instead of
its persistence.
Labour
The ﬁrst control factors that we include in our analysis are for labour. Compared to other
costs, labour costs are not easy to adjust. Since labour costs are the lion share of the costs in the
services sector, we expect inﬂation persistence of services to be higher. That inﬂation persistence
diﬀers across sectors is shown by previous studies. For example, Lunnemann and Mathä (2005)
ﬁnd that aggregate inﬂation persistence is lower when services are excluded. We correct for the
role of labour by including two control variables. The ﬁrst control variable is an indicator of the
labour intensity of the production process (LS) while the second control variable measures the
ﬂexibility of wage setting (WF).
Regarding the ﬁrst control variable, we use "Production process sophistication", which is
the survey response to the statement "Production processes use (1=labor-intensive methods
or previous generations of process technology, 7= the world’s best and most eﬃcient process
technology)." This so-called soft indicator is taken from the yearly Global Competitiveness Report
(GCR) of the World Economic Forum (WEF).
The second control variable we consider is an indicator of the degree of labour market ﬂexi-
bility. By modifying a New Keynesian Business cycle model (by including a labour market with
matching frictions and rigid wages), Christoﬀel and Linzert (2005) show that the more rigid wages
are the more persistent inﬂation is. Hoeberichts and Stokman (2006, p.15) ﬁnd that especially
in the services sector, wages are relevant for price setting behavior of ﬁrms. As an indicator for
this degree of ﬂexibility we include "Flexibility of wage determination" (source: GCR, WEF).
This series reﬂects the answers to the survey statement: "Wages in your country are (1=set by
a centralized bargaining process, 7= up to each individual company)". The higher this variable
is, the larger the degree of wage ﬂexibility (WF).
Degree of competition
Another factor relevant for price setting behavior is the degree of competition that ﬁrms face.
When the degree of competition is high, inﬂation persistence will be lower because in order to
keep market shares, inﬂation will quickly return to its equilibrium level after a shock dies out. As
a control variable we use "Intensity of local competition", which is the outcome of the following
survey statement: "Competition in the local market is (1=limited in most industries and price-
cutting is rare, 7= intense in most industries as market leadership changes over time)" (source:
GCR, WEF). What we expect to ﬁnd is a negative sign on the degree of competition interaction
6Corvoisier and Mojon (2005) show that in most OECD countries three breaks in the mean inﬂation
rate occurred: one to a higher mean (end of the 1960s, beginning 1970s), and two to a lower mean (one
in the early to mid 1980s and one in the early 1990s). Ignoring these breaks in inﬂation results into
persistence measures that are too high (see also Gadzinski and Orlandi, 2004).
14term (DoCi,t*πi,t−1). The higher this indicator of competition is, the lower inﬂation persistence
would be. After a shock in an environment of ﬁerce competition ﬁrms would be eager to bring
inﬂation quickly back to their equilibrium degree.7
Technology
The extent of technology usage in a country might be relevant for inﬂation persistence. One
explanation that Dhyne et al. (2006) give for the lower price stickiness in the United States
compared to Europe are the lower costs of price changes resulting from a higher level of technology
in the retail sector (e.g. more superstores and e-commerce). If the costs of changing prices are
low it will be easier for price setters to put price changes back at a lower level after a detrimental
inﬂation shock dies out.
Another reason for a link between the degree of technology and inﬂation persistence, is the
fact that internet usage makes it easy to compare prices. In an environment without internet
usage one only needs to compete with ﬁrms that are geographically close, whereas internet
usage intensiﬁes the number of competitors. Competition puts downward pressure on inﬂation
persistence: inﬂation will move quickly back to its equilibrium level after the occurrence of a
shock.
As an indicator for the degree of ICT intensity we consider technological readiness (TR).
This pillar (based on several questions, source: GCR WEF), focusses on the agility with which
existing productivity enhancing technologies are adopted.
Customer relations
Customer relations, either implicit or explicit, are an important factor in explaining price
stickiness (Fabiani et al. 2005). We expect that when ﬁrms put a lot of eﬀort in contracts with
customers then current price increases will be in line with previous price increases: inﬂation is
persistent. Instead when not much value is attached to customer relations then inﬂation will
show more variability and less persistence. To correct for the strength of customer relations
(CR) in a particular country over time we add "Degree of customer orientation" (source: GCR,
WEF). This is the outcome in response to the statement "Firms in your country (1=generally
treat their customers badly, 7=are highly responsive to customers and customer retention)".
In our analysis we do not only control for factors that aﬀect the level of inﬂation persistence
but we include controls for the level of inﬂation too.
Institutions
Good public and private institutions are crucial for the well-functioning of the economy. They
might also indicate the quality of one particular institution: the central bank. We expect that the
better these institutions are, the lower inﬂation will be. To correct for the quality of institutions
we include the pillar "institutions" from the GCR 2007-2008 (WEF). This pillar measures the
overall quality of both private and public institutions. Examples of factors that are taken into
account are the security of owner rights, corruption and overregulation. Institutions are often
regarded as being relevant for economic outcomes.
Globalization
Nowadays, inﬂation is low and stable in many countries. One explanation for this artefact is
that the world has become more globalized (see e.g. Greenspan 2005). The increase in global
competition puts downward pressure on prices because both companies and employees have lower
market power. To correct for the degree of globalization we include the measure of the degree of
competition (DoC), so in addition to the interaction term (DoCi,t*πi,t−1).
7Since it could be that this soft control variable does not measure competition diﬀerences between
countries that well, we consider another hard control variable: the share of exports to GDP (source:
International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund). A more open country is likely to face
more competition. This would result in lower inﬂation persistence.
15Inﬂation targeting
Another often mentioned explanation for low inﬂation is the conduct of better monetary
policy. The focus of monetary policy on price stability has increased; a lot of central banks now
act independently from the government and several central banks have become inﬂation targeters.
To prevent that central bank transparency is grasping up an overall better conduct on monetary
policy, we correct for the fact that some countries are (or have become) inﬂation targeters.
3.4 Results
The results of the estimation of equation (8) including all control variables are in Table 2 column
(1). Transparency matters for inﬂation persistence: the coeﬃcient on πt−1Tt is negative and
signiﬁcant and the coeﬃcient on πt−1T2
t is positive and signiﬁcant. These results support our
hypothesis, that there is an optimal degree of transparency beyond which extra transparency
results in more inﬂation persistence.
Table 2. Central bank transparency and inﬂation persistence: Panel Least Squares
(1) (2) (3)
coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value
α 14.34*** (0.00) 13.26*** (0.00) 12.76*** (0.00)
INSTi,t -1.27*** (0.00) -1.22*** (0.00) -1.14*** (0.00)
DoCi,t -1.32*** (0.00) -1.12*** (0.00) -1.05*** (0.00)
ITi,t 0.95* (0.10) 0.77 (0.18)
π i,t-1 0.58* (0.08) 0.80*** (0.00) 0.81*** (0.00)
π i,t-1Ti,t -0.14*** (0.00) -0.13*** (0.00) -0.13*** (0.00)
π i,t-1T²i,t 0.01*** (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00)
π i,t-1WFi,t -0.14*** (0.00) -0.16*** (0.00) -0.16*** (0.00)
π i,t-1LSi,t 0.02 (0.61)
π i,t-1DoCi,t 0.02 (0.44)
π i,t-1TRi,t 0.05 (0.41)
π i,t-1CRi,t 0.16*** (0.00) 0.19*** (0.00) 0.19*** (0.00)
π i,t-1ITi,t -0.47*** (0.00) -0.42*** (0.00) -0.34*** (0.00)
R² 0.39 0.39 0.39
Sample 1998q1-2005q4 1998q1-2005q4 1998q1-2005q4
Countries 70 70 70
Total panel 2188 2188 2188
S.E. of regression 8.26 8.27 8.27
DW 1.94 1.93 1.94
Note: Results of the estimation of equation (8) using q.o.q. inﬂation rates that are annualized. DoC=degree
of competition, INST=quality of public and private institutions, IT=inﬂation targeting regime, πt−1 =
inﬂation in the previous period, T=transparency index (Dincer and Eichengreen 2007), WF=wage ﬂexi-
bility, LS=labour share, TR= technological readiness and CR=customer relations. For more information
on the variables we refer to Appendix A.
For the level of inﬂation several factors are relevant: the quality of institutions, the degree
of competition and the presence of an inﬂation targeting regime. As expected, better quality of
public and private institutions results in a lower degree of inﬂation. We can conﬁrm previous
research that globalization reduces inﬂation.8 The IT-dummy is positive. Probably this is the
8Alternatively we included exports instead of DoC. This variable is instead not signiﬁcant. DoC is
not only capturing globalization but likely other factors that inﬂuence the degree of competition too.
16result of the cross-country eﬀect. That is, those countries that suﬀer from relatively high inﬂation
are likely to opt for an inﬂation targeting regime.
In addition to these controls for the level of inﬂation, we have included controls for the degree
of inﬂation persistence too. Half of these variables have a signiﬁcant eﬀect. The coeﬃcient
on WF*πt−1 is negative, which conﬁrms the negative relationship between wage ﬂexibility and
inﬂation persistence that we foresaw. The positive eﬀect of the degree of customer orientation on
inﬂation persistence is also in line with our expectations. The labor-intensity of the production
process, the degree of competition and technological readiness are not signiﬁcantly related to
inﬂation persistence.9 In Appendix B.1 we compare the outcomes presented in Column (1)
with those of a regression where we exclude central bank transparency. These results show that
transparency is not picking up the eﬀect of any other variable since the same control variables
are signiﬁcant in this alternative speciﬁcation.
In our second regression, presented in Column (2), we have dropped the insigniﬁcant control
variables. The signs and signiﬁcances of the coeﬃcients remain except for the intercept inﬂation
targeting dummy. In Column (3) we present our ﬁnal speciﬁcation where the level eﬀect of IT is
excluded from the regression.
To get more insight into these results, the eﬀect of transparency on the degree of inﬂation
persistence is plotted in Figure 4. This ﬁgure is obtained by calculating the eﬀect of transparency
on the persistence coeﬃcient (B) for all theoretically possible values of the central bank trans-
parency index (T): β2T +β3T 2. In line with our hypothesis we observe a parabola.10 The ﬁnding















































Figure 4. Eﬀect of central bank transparency on inﬂation persistence
Note: This ﬁgure plots the eﬀect of central bank transparency (T) on inﬂation persistence (B): β2T +
β3T2 using q.o.q annualized inﬂation rates. Note that T>13.5 and T=12.5 are not observed in our
sample.
Note that, as mentioned in Section 3.1, while in theory the observed transparency degree
could be 15 in our sample we observe 13.5 at the most. Starting left at the x-axis where the value
of the transparency index is 0, moving along the x-axis to the right (where transparency is higher)
ﬁrst results in less inﬂation persistence. Inﬂation persistence is minimized at a degree of central
bank transparency of 6. Turning to the range where transparency is higher than this optimum,
more transparency is accompanied with higher inﬂation persistence. Central banks would be wise
to not become full transparent. Because most countries have a lower degree of transparency than
9The alternative indicator for the degree of competition, the share of exports to GDP was not signif-
icant either.
10There is no evidence for asymmetry around the optimum. We have tested this by adding the variable
πt−1T3 to equation (8).
17the optimal degree, they might still beneﬁt from further transparency increases. The lower the
initial amount of central bank transparency is, the higher the beneﬁt of additional transparency
will be.
It is important to note that although our case for the existence of an optimal intermediate
degree of transparency is robust to various settings, the exact value of this optimum is not. Our
confusion-argument highlights the importance of the capacity of the private sector to absorb
information disclosed by the central bank. Because these skills are country-speciﬁc, diﬀerent
countries are likely to have diﬀerent optimal degrees of transparency. In Appendix B.3 we
illustrate this by presenting the results of two alternative regressions: one including only non-
OECD-countries and one with only OECD-countries. Based on OECD-countries we ﬁnd an
optimum of 7.5 instead of 6. The optimal level of transparency that we ﬁnd is also sensitive
to the transparency levels that are observed in practice. Although theoretically transparency
ranges between 0 and 15, in practice we do not observe very high levels. In addition, low degrees
of transparency are observed much more frequent than high degrees of transparency. For more
details on the transparency data we refer to Appendix A.1. Note also that it is complicated to
measure transparency, e.g. to establish which weight various manners of information disclosure
should get.
4 Conclusion
We investigate whether it is desirable for central banks to increase their degree of transparency
any further. While previous research analyzed the desirability of particular forms of transparency,
we focus on the optimal overall degree of monetary policy transparency. We argue that some
intermediate degree of transparency might be desirability. We start our case for an optimal degree
of transparency by relating transparency to the quality of private sector inﬂation forecasts. By
using two arguments, uncertainty and confusion/information overload, we point out that there
is likely to be an optimal intermediate degree of central bank transparency at which the quality
of inﬂation forecasts is optimized.
Although some degree of transparency might be helpful because it improves the quality of
private sector inﬂation forecasts, a lot of transparency might be detrimental. First, it could
lead to confusion/information overload. As an example consider the Financial Stability Reports
published by various central banks. These reports contain a lot of information, which might
complicate it for private agents too see the forest for the trees and harms their inﬂation forecasts.
Second, although some information on the conditionality of intended policy and economic out-
comes might improve the quality of private sector forecasts, too much information on uncertainty
might lower the perceived quality of private sector inﬂation forecasts.
As a proxy for the quality of inﬂation forecasts we take the degree to which inﬂation is
formed in a backward looking way. The higher this degree of backward lookingness is the more
persistent inﬂation is (which we illustrate with a standard New-Keynesian model). A last step we
then take in our theoretical argumentation is to relate inﬂation persistence, which is measurable,
to transparency.
In practice several relationships between transparency and inﬂation persistence might be ob-
served. For example, it might be that full secrecy or complete transparency is optimal. Therefore
we test whether our case for an optimal intermediate degree of transparency can be conﬁrmed by
the data. We link transparency data from 1998-2005 for 100 central banks to inﬂation persistence
and ﬁnd support for our hypothesis. There is an optimal intermediate degree of transparency:
neither full secrecy nor complete transparency is optimal. This result is robust to changes in the
countries included and the lag speciﬁcation chosen. The exact value we observe for the optimum
should however be interpreted with care. Our baseline regression, including all countries, results
in an optimum of 6. Theoretically, values between 0 and 15 are possible. Note that in practice
however there is a high incidence of low degrees of central bank transparency whereas very high
degrees of transparency (more than 13.5) are not observed at all. The exact value of the op-
18timum we ﬁnd is dependent on the countries we include. For example, when we consider only
OECD-countries the optimum shifts to 7.5. Because the optimal degree of transparency depends
on the capacity of the private sector to process information (our confusion-argument) it makes
sense to observe a higher optimal degree of central bank transparency for OECD-countries, since
their inhabitants are better skilled to process information. In addition, we should note that there
might be other ways in which transparency inﬂuences the economy, not only through aﬀecting
the quality of inﬂation forecasts. The optimal degree of transparency might shift when taking
these eﬀects into account as well.
Most central banks have quite a low degreeof transparency (the median degree of transparency
in 2005 was 5) and our results suggest that more transparency is likely to be beneﬁcial for these
central banks. It could to lead to a better quality of the private sector forecasts resulting in
lower inﬂation persistence. However, several central banks (e.g. the US Federal Reserve and
the European Central Bank) already have a high degree of transparency. It is good for these
central banks to keep in mind that it is wise to not become completely transparent. A high
degree of transparency could result in confusion and to too much awareness of the central bank’s
uncertainty. This might be detrimental for the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy since inﬂation
will be more persistent and therefore more diﬃcult to aﬀect.
A caveat of our research is that central bank transparency is something which is diﬃcult to
measure objectively. Perhaps central banks have invented new ways to be transparent, which are
not included in the transparency measures currently at hand. Furthermore it is diﬃcult to weigh
diﬀerent forms of transparency. Our analysis suggests that it might be helpful for future research
to construct alternative measures of transparency that measure the clarity of information instead
of the quantity.
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22A Data
A.1 Central bank transparency
Table A1. Central bank transparency data
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Minimum 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
(B) (B) (B) (A&B) (A&B) (A) (A) (A)
Maximum 11 13 13 13 13.5 13.5 13.5 13.5
(UK) (NZ) (NZ) (NZ) (NZ) (NZ) (NZ) (NZ)
Average 3.4 3.6 3.9 4.2 4.7 4.9 5.1 5.2
Stdev 2.4 2.6 2.7 2.8 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Source: Based on the data set from Dincer and Eichengreen (2007), which includes 100 countries.


















































Figure A1. Central bank transparency data
A.2 Inﬂation
Deﬁnition: quarter on quarter annualized inﬂation rate.
Calculation: πi,t = ((CPIi,t − CPIi,t−1)/CPIi,t−1)∗100∗4 where CPI is the Consumer Price Index
of country i at time t.
Source: quarterly CPI data from the International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics.
A.3 Control variables
Labour share (LS)
Indicator: Production process sophistication
Deﬁnition: this is the survey response to the statement "Production processes use (1=labor-intensive
methods or previous generations of process technology, 7=the world’s best and most eﬃcient process
technology)
Source: The Global Competitiveness Report, World Economic Forum. Report 2002-2003 and 2003-2004
(series 10.06), 2004-2005 (series 9.06), 2005-2006 (series 8.05). For 2000 and 2001 we take the 2002-2003
value, because of a slightly diﬀerent deﬁnition of the survey question (without labour). For 1998 and
1999 we take this 2002-2003 value too (also because the 1998 and 1999 report are not available in any of
the Dutch libraries and on the WEF-site one can only buy reports from 2001 onwards).
23Wage ﬂexibility (WF)
Indicator: Flexibility of wage determination
Deﬁnition: this is the survey response to the statement: "Wages in your country are (1=set by a
centralized bargaining process, 7=up to each individual company)".
Source: The Global Competitiveness Report, World Economic Forum. Report 2000 (series 6.11, only
slightly diﬀerent deﬁnition. "Wage setting. Wages are determined by each individual company. (1=strongly
disagree; 7=strongly agree)"), report 2002-2003 (series 10.19), report 2003-2004 (series 10.19), report
2004-2005 (series 9.19), report 2005-2006 (series 8.18). For 1998 and 1999 we take the 2000 value since
these reports are not available in any of the Dutch libraries and on the WEF-site one can only buy
reports from 2001 onwards. This question is not included in the 2001-2002 report, therefore we take the
average of the 2000 and 2002-2003 as the 2001 value.
Competition (DoC and Exports)
Indicator 1: Degree of competition (DoC)
Deﬁnition: Intensity of local competition is the outcome of the following survey statement: "Competition
in the local market is (1=limited in most industries and price-cutting is rare, 7= intense in most industries
as market leadership changes over time)".
Source: The Global Competitiveness Report, World Economic Forum report 2000 (series 10.01), 2001-
2002, 2002-2003 and 2003-2004 (all series 8.01), report 2004-2005 and 2005-2006 (both series 7.01). For
1998 and 1999 we take the 2000 value since these reports are not available in any of the Dutch libraries
and on the WEF-site one can only buy reports from 2001 onwards. The deﬁnitions in the 2000 and 2001-
2002 are slightly diﬀerent. Deﬁnition 2000 report: "Local competition. Competition in local markets
is intense and market shares ﬂuctuate constantly. (1=strongly disagree;7=strongly agree)". Deﬁnition
2001-2002 report: "In most industries, competition in the local market is (1=limited and price-cutting
is rare, 7=intense and market leadership changes over time)".
Indicator 2: Exports.
Deﬁnition: exports as a share of GDP.
Source: International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund.
Technology (TR)
Indicator: Technological Readiness
Source: The Global Competitiveness Report 2005-2006, World Economic Forum. Note that there is
one data point for each country. We assume values to be constant over time. On p.41 of the report
it is explained that technological readiness is the average of series 3.01 (Technological Readiness), 3.02
(Firm-level technology absorption), 3.15 (Laws relating to ICT), 3.04 (FDI and technology transfer),
3.18 (Cellular telephones (hard data)), 3.19 (Internet users (hard data)) and 3.21 (personal computers
(hard data)).
Customer relations (CR)
Indicator: Degree of customer orientation
Deﬁnition: This is the survey response to the statement "Firms in your country (1=generally treat their
customers badly, 7=are highly responsive to customers and customer retention)".
Source: The Global Competitiveness Report, World Economic Forum report 2000 (series 11.08), 2001-
2002, 2002-2003 and 2003-2004 (all series 10.08), report 2004-2005 (series 9.08) and 2005-2006 (series
8.07). For 1998 and 1999 we take the 2000 value since these reports are not available in any of the Dutch
libraries and on the WEF-site one can only buy reports from 2001 onwards. The deﬁnitions in the 2000
and 2001-2002 are slightly diﬀerent. Deﬁnition 2000 report: "Firms generally pay close attention to
customer satisfaction. (1=strongly disagree; 7=strongly agree)". Deﬁnition 2001-2002 report: "Firms in
your country (1=generally treat their customers badly, 7=pay close attention to customer satisfaction)".
Institutions (INST)
Indicator: Institutions.
24Deﬁnition: a pillar based on various series, which measures the quality of public and private institutions
(see Global Competitiveness Report 2007-2008, p.4).
Source: The Global Competitiveness Report 2007-2008, World Economic Forum.
Inﬂation targeting (IT)
Deﬁnition: This dummy variable is 1 for a particular central bank at a particular moment in time, if
there is an inﬂation targeting regime. Otherwise this dummy is 0.
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook 2005: Chapter IV, Does inﬂation targeting work in emerging
markets? Table 4.1, p.162 (source: National authorities).
IT Countries (adoption date): Israel (1997Q2), Czech Republic (1998Q1), Korea (1998Q2), Poland
(1999Q1), Brazil (1999Q2), Chile (1999Q3), Colombia (1999Q3), South Africa (2000Q1), Thailand
(2000Q2), Mexico (2001Q1), Hungary (2001Q3), Peru (2002Q1), Philippines (2002Q1), New Zealand
(1990Q1), Canada (1991Q1), United Kingdom (1992Q4), Australia (1993Q1) and Sweden (1993Q1),
Switzerland (2000Q1), Iceland (2001Q1), Norway (2001Q1).
B Speciﬁcation tests
B.1 Regressions with and without transparency
Table B1. Inﬂation persistence: Panel Least Squares with and without transparency
(1a) (1b)
coef. p-value coef. p-value
α 14.34*** (0.00) 14.03*** (0.00)
INSTi,t -1.27*** (0.00) -1.17*** (0.00)
DoCi,t -1.32*** (0.00) -1.35*** (0.00)
ITi,t 0.95* (0.10) 1.04* (0.07)
π i,t-1 0.58* (0.08) -0.09*** (0.00)
π i,t-1Ti,t -0.14*** (0.00)
π i,t-1T²i,t 0.01*** (0.00)
π i,t-1WFi,t -0.14*** (0.00) -0.09*** (0.00)
π i,t-1LSi,t 0.02 (0.61) 0.00 (0.94)
π i,t-1DoCi,t 0.02 (0.44) 0.01 (0.72)
π i,t-1TRi,t 0.05 (0.41) 0.01 (0.89)
π i,t-1CRi,t 0.16*** (0.00) 0.23*** (0.00)




Total panel 2188 2188
S.E. of regression 8.26 8.32
DW 1.94 1.94
Note: Results of the estimation of equation (8) using q.o.q. inﬂation rates that are annualized. DoC=degree
of competition, INST=quality of public and private institutions, IT=inﬂation targeting regime, πt−1 =
inﬂation in the previous period, T=transparency index (Dincer and Eichengreen 2007), WF=wage ﬂexi-
bility, LS=labour share, TR=technological readiness and CR=customer relations. For more information
on the variables we refer to Appendix A.
25B.2 Additional autoregressive terms
To get an alternative measure of inﬂation persistence which is based on more lags (q) we need to
include additional autoregressive terms in equation (8). The equation to estimate then becomes
as follows:
















β3+n,qYn,i,tπi,t−q + εi,t (10)
With π=inﬂation, α=a constant, T=the degree of transparency, and ε=the error term. i =
1,2,..,I indicates the cross-sectional units and t = 1,2,..T the periods. Z is a vector of control
variables that aﬀect the level of inﬂation. In addition we include a set of n control variables (Y )
that aﬀect the degree of inﬂation persistence. In the baseline analysis (presented in the main
text), we have included one lag (q = 1). Here we report the outcomes of up to four lags (q = 4).


















The optimal transparency we ﬁnd (6) turns out to be robust to the lag speciﬁcation. The



















































Figure B1. Eﬀect of central bank transparency on inﬂation persistence: various lag lenghts
Note: This ﬁgure plots the eﬀect of central bank transparency (T) on inﬂation persistence (B): ￿Q
q=1 (β2,qT +β3,qT2) for various lag lengths (Q = 1, Q = 2, Q = 3 and Q = 4). Note that T>13.5
and T=12.5 are not observed in our sample (indicated with -’s in the ﬁgure).
26Table B2. Central bank transparency and inﬂation persistence: Panel Least Squares
with various lag lengths
(1) (2) (3)
coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value
α 15.58*** (0.00) 11.56*** (0.00) 10.00*** (0.00)
INSTi,t -1.31*** (0.00) -1.05*** (0.00) -0.95*** (0.00)
DoCi,t -1.45*** (0.00) -0.95*** (0.00) -0.78** (0.03)
π i,t-1 0.48 (0.16) 0.46 (0.17) 0.10 (0.78)
π i,t-1Ti,t -0.11*** (0.00) -0.10*** (0.00) -0.08** (0.03)
π i,t-1T²i,t 0.00 (0.12) 0.00 (0.25) 0.00 (0.40)
π i,t-1WFi,t -0.05 (0.18) -0.02 (0.56) 0.02 (0.58)
π i,t-1CRi,t 0.14*** (0.00) 0.11** (0.02) 0.12** (0.02)
π i,t-1ITi,t -0.15 (0.24) -0.09 (0.46) -0.19 (0.15)
π i,t-2 0.28 (0.41) 0.05 (0.90) 0.14 (0.70)
π i,t-2Ti,t -0.03 (0.32) -0.02 (0.69) -0.02 (0.59)
π i,t-2T²i,t 0.01** (0.03) 0.01 (0.11) 0.01 (0.19)
π i,t-2WFi,t -0.17*** (0.00) -0.18*** (0.00) -0.17*** (0.00)
π i,t-2CRi,t 0.12*** (0.01) 0.16*** (0.00) 0.14*** (0.00)
π i,t-2ITi,t -0.25** (0.04) -0.21 (0.11) -0.14 (0.30)
π i,t-3 0.64** (0.04) -0.35 (0.36)
π i,t-3Ti,t -0.03 (0.39) 0.03 (0.39)
π i,t-3T²i,t 0.00 (0.66) -0.00 (0.62)
π i,t-3WFi,t 0.01 (0.79) 0.14*** (0.00)
π i,t-3CRi,t -0.10*** (0.00) -0.09** (0.04)
π i,t-3ITi,t -0.00 (0.98) -0.12 (0.36)
π i,t-4 1.63*** (0.00)
π i,t-4Ti,t -0.08*** (0.00)
π i,t-4T²i,t 0.01 (0.12)
π i,t-4WFi,t -0.19*** (0.00)
π i,t-4CRi,t -0.07** (0.04)
π i,t-4ITi,t 0.22* (0.05)
R² 0.41 0.44 0.46
Sample 1998q1-2005q4 1998q1-2005q4 1998q1-2005q4
Countries 70 70 70
Total panel 2185 2182 2179
S.E. of regression 8.11 7.93 7.83
DW 1.92 2.03 1.97
Note: Results of the estimation of equation 10 using various lag lengths (Q = 2, Q = 3 and Q = 4).
DoC=degree of competition, INST=quality of public and private institutions, π = inﬂation, T=transparency
index (Dincer and Eichengreen 2007), WF=wage ﬂexibility, CR=customer relations. For more informa-
tion on the variables we refer to Appendix A.
27B.3 Splitting the sample: OECD versus Non-OECD
Table B3. Central bank transparency and inﬂation persistence: Various samples
(1) (2) (3)
All countries OECD Non-OECD
coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value
α 12.76*** (0.00) 6.55** (0.03) 15.42*** (0.00)
INSTi,t -1.14*** (0.00) -1.17*** (0.00) -1.12*** (0.00)
DoCi,t -1.05*** (0.00) 0.34 (0.54) -1.63*** (0.00)
π i,t-1 0.81*** (0.00) 2.65*** (0.00) 0.36 (0.24)
π i,t-1Ti,t -0.13*** (0.00) -0.10** (0.02) -0.15*** (0.00)
π i,t-1T²i,t 0.01*** (0.00) 0.01* (0.07) 0.01* (0.02)
π i,t-1WFi,t -0.16*** (0.00) -0.22*** (0.00) -0.07* (0.06)
π i,t-1CRi,t 0.19*** (0.00) -0.13* (0.07) 0.18*** (0.00)
π i,t-1ITi,t -0.34*** (0.00) -0.44*** (0.00) -0.13 (0.40)
R² 0.39 0.71 0.31
Sample 1998q1-2005q4 1998q1-2005q4 1998q1-2005q4
Countries 70 18 52
Total panel 2188 576 1612
S.E. of regression 8.27 5.23 9.01
DW 1.94 2.33 1.86
Note: Results of the estimation of equation (10) using various samples. DoC=degree of competition,
INST=quality of public and private institutions, π = inﬂation, T=transparency index (Dincer and
Eichengreen 2007), WF=wage ﬂexibility, CR=customer relations. For more information on the variables
















































Figure B2. Eﬀect of central bank transparency on inﬂation persistence: Various samples
Note: This ﬁgure plots the eﬀect of central bank transparency (T) on inﬂation persistence (B): β2T +β3T2
for various samples. Transparency levels that are not observed are indicated with -’s.
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